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Budgeting and Governing for Deficit Reduction in the UK Public Sector: Act Two ‘The 
Budget’ 
 
Abstract 
 
At the time of the 2010 General Election in the UK, all of the major political parties agreed 
that tackling the deficit was a priority. However, the affectivity towards this objective and 
rules were not agreed upon in terms of the timing and depth of necessary spending cuts. 
Nonetheless, within a year of taking office after the election, the Coalition Government of 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats set out a series of policies and initiatives at three 
junctures: the June 2010 “emergency” Budget, the October 2010 Spending Review and the 
March 2011 Budget. 
 
The emergency Budget acted as a prologue for a more comprehensive programme of 
reductions in public spending. The Spending Review later that year set out the framework for 
further cuts over the medium term, and it can be considered as ‘Act One’ in Budgeting and 
Governing. ‘Act Two’ was the March 2011 Budget, which announced a further series of 
initiatives to reduce the public deficit and stimulate private sector growth. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly consider how the annual Budget process for resource 
allocation took place within the medium term planning framework of the Spending Review 
and the context of uncertain conditions. Therefore it considers ‘Act Two’ in the wider context 
of Act One, and finds that whilst the Spending Review provides a veneer of stability, changes 
to both departmental expenditure limits and annually managed expenditure within the Budget 
shift the underlying accounting measures of what is transparently being accomplished. The 
broader finding is therefore that annual Budgets are not constrained within the Spending 
Review framework, but are instead enablers of changing circumstances. 
 
Key Words: Budget, Enabling Control, Governing, Public Sector; Government and Non-
Profit; Financial Crisis; Deficit Reduction 
 
 
 
 
50-word summary 
 
This article shows how the UK Government was able to announce policies in its 2011 annual 
Budget and associated processes that sat outside the 2010 Spending Review framework. It 
therefore shows that the Budget process remains an enabler of changing circumstances and is 
not constrained by medium term financial planning. 
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Introduction 
 
This article analyses how the political theory of budgeting is being applied to the national 
budgeting process in the UK. It considers specifically how changes occur through the annual 
Budget within the Government’s Spending Review framework, using a conceptual approach 
based on political theory of budgeting as a practice.  As the context used is very current, an 
explanatory study methodology has been employed for this initial article.  
 
For the purpose of this paper, Budgeting and Governing as practice in the UK public sector 
can be regarded as three acts: 
 
· Act One is the Spending Review that sets out a framework for expenditure levels over 
the medium term as part of multi-year planning (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011).  
· Act Two is the annual Budget that provides more detailed policy choices with 
resulting financial impacts and implications.  
· Act Three is the Audit / Post-implementation Review.  
 
In times of uncertainty, which may follow major changes in the wider political or financial 
environment, there may also be a prologue to these acts in the form of an “Emergency” 
Budget. This occurred in the UK after the Coalition Government took office in the spring of 
2010. 
 
Multi-year planning alongside annual Budgets has been theoretically considered (Wildavsky, 
1964, 1975, 1988), proposed globally (Schick, 2009) and adopted in the UK since the mid-
1990s (Hyndman et al. 2006). The Labour Government introduced the concept of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review to set the context for annual Budgets between 1997 and 
2010 – a period of relative economic certainty until the financial crisis began in 2008. From 
2010 onwards the Coalition Government also employed a Spending Review with annual 
Budgets, although this was during a period of economic uncertainty. 
 
The Coalition’s Spending Review, like its forerunners from the Labour Government, is 
considered to provide a stable framework within which Government can plan, construct and 
implement (in other words constrain) the annual Budget. However, it is the contention of this 
paper that the Spending Review is an external legitimation of stability that can be decoupled 
from the annual Budget. In fact, the uses and processes within the Budget enable flexibility in 
policy implementation that does not break the veneer of certainty afforded by the Spending 
Review. This is because the Budget can make changes to policy, such as through the use of 
entitlements and transfer of roles to non-state actors, whilst remaining within the Spending 
Review’s boundaries. 
 
This article focuses on Act Two – in particular how the annual Budget takes place within the 
medium term planning framework of the Spending Review. In this case, it will be specifically 
considered within the context of uncertain conditions. To do so the paper will briefly review 
literature on public sector budgeting and governing, before considering the UK Government’s 
2010 Spending Review and its March 2011 Budget. 
 
Public Sector Budgeting and Governing 
 
This article draws on a theoretical framework that has been developed from the public 
administration aspects of political theory and from public sector accountancy (Wildavsky, 
1964, 1975, 1988). It employs this as a conceptual frame of reference, together with practices 
(Schatzki, 2002, 2005, 2010; Ahrens and Chapman, 2007) that constitute rules, teleoaffective 
structures of objectives and affectivity towards them, and understandings to consider how 
political budget theory is being applied to the national budgeting process in the UK. 
 
The most important body of political theory was the seminal work of Wildavsky (1964, 1975, 
and 1988) on the practice and politics of comparative budgeting in public sector organisations 
and the associated concepts of political and budgetary incrementalism (Wildavsky and 
Hammond, 1965; Wildavsky, 1978), as well as the private government of public money 
(Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974). Wildavsky (1978) initially defended annual incremental 
budgeting as a way to govern in both times of growth and austerity, but later abandoned this 
position in light of the changing political environment (Wildavsky, 1988). He observed in the 
USA that much government expenditure now escaped annual review, because 46% of the 
Federal Budget was spent on entitlements, 28% on defence and 14% on debt interest. 
Consequently, much of the annual Budget fights were about the small proportion (12%) that 
remained. More rational budget approaches were therefore considered, including zero-based 
budgeting, planned programme budgeting systems and priority-based budgeting, each of 
which have their own advantages and disadvantages. The UK has experienced a similar 
movement in the make-up of public spending all be it to different levels, and employed a 
number of these budget methods at different times and to various extents (see Coombs and 
Jenkins, 2001; Jones and Pendlebury, 2010; Prowle, 2009; Seal and Ball, 2006 for a 
discussion).  
 
Nonetheless, all of these variations keep to the basic principle of annual Budgets. In their 
exploratory study of annuality in public budgeting, Hyndman et al. (2006) found it to be a 
widespread phenomenon. 'Annuality’ refers to the way in which Budget allocations have to 
be spent by the end of a financial year or be surrendered to a central authority or budget-
holder. Whilst there are certain benefits of annuality for those at the centre of an organisation 
who wish to impose traditional central control, it is argued that it can lead to dysfunctional 
spending behaviour that is uneconomical, inefficient and ineffective and can therefore fail to 
provide value for money.  
 
To try and overcome these problems, medium term financial plans have become common 
accounting practice, and they normally sit alongside the annual Budget in public 
administration (Schick, 2009). This has the advantage of allowing longer term planning than 
is possible under a system of annual authorisations and gives greater flexibility at the 
centralised control level of government departments. In the UK central government context, 
the Spending Review provides the medium term framework to manage the strategic reform of 
public expenditure control, usually over a three or four year-period. It also sets the context for 
policy development through associated performance management arrangements such as the 
Public Service Agreements that were introduced by the Labour Government in 1997 (Rhodes, 
2011). The annual Budget process deals with politics and resource allocations within the 
overall Spending Review framework, but at a more nuanced level (Hyndman et al. 2006).  
 
These concepts of political theory have often been linked in accounting research to other 
research ideas and in particular neo-institutional theory. For example, Hopwood (1984) 
suggested accounting’s role in the public sector reflected Foucauldian ideas of discipline and 
visibility but also made an explicit link to institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer, 1979). Covaleski et al. (1993), calling on institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Di Maggio and Powell, 1983), highlight the importance of organisations conforming to 
societal standards and norms of expected practice in order to derive legitimacy. To do so, 
institutions tend to decouple external image systems from the more complex and ambiguous 
practices and processes through which organisational members carry out their tasks. Public 
sector organisations must therefore create, maintain and manage legitimacy in order to 
receive continued support and maintain their funding (Bealing, 1994), even if the accounting 
systems operate as a “myth”, legitimating the actions of the service to the major elements of 
its external controlling environment (Lapsley, 1994).  
 
Drawing from neo-institutional, organisational and political theory, Brunsson (1995), 
Edwards et al. (1995) and Pettersen (1995) highlight the functionalism of budgets, but also 
their role in generating legitimacy and the importance of following rules, values and 
rationalised myth. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1995) emphasise the need to understand the 
power and self-interest that reside within the various exemplars of formal organisations. 
From this Johnsen (1999) argued that decoupled or loosely coupled implementation processes 
may serve instrumental purposes rather than merely symbolic purposes, fashion or 
legitimisation. Central themes of neo-institutionalism remain isomorphism and legitimacy 
(Gomes et al. 2008; Kasperskaya, 2008). However, some authors have sought to expand the 
engagement with broader neo-institutional theory literature (Tolbert, 1995; Oliver, 1997; 
Modell et al. 2007). There has also been some effort to supplement the macro focus of neo-
institutionalism with micro levels of analysis (Ezzamel et al. 2007; Modell, 2006). The trend 
of blending a neo-institutional approach with other theoretical perspectives also continues 
(Nor-Aziah and Scapens, 2007; Hopper and Major, 2007). 
 
Seal (1999), through an institutionalist interpretation of the new public management in UK 
local government, illustrated the role of accounting in compulsory competitive tendering that 
created a form of contract governance. He also illustrated the modernity, modernisation and 
deinstitutionalisation of incremental budgeting in local government through the introduction 
and use of the Best Value performance management framework (Seal 2003). Seal and Ball 
(2005) considered regulating corporate performance and the managerialisation of local 
politics and illustrated the impact of policy innovations on traditional budgeting practices 
(Seal and Ball 2006). They showed local authorities developed long and medium term plans 
intended to indicate the councils’ priorities and guide long-term financial strategies, and 
developed new reporting systems that not only picked up the traditional budgetary variances 
but also monitored non-financial performance.  
 
More recently, Seal and Ball (2011) developed a dialectic of control theoretical framework to 
explain turbulence in public sector budgeting. This was applied to fieldwork from two large 
UK local authorities with a crisis in education funding to explore the knowledge and 
intentionality of actors engaged in budgeting. They found that cognitive issues based around 
unreliability of cost and planning data were significant in tactical success for local budgeting. 
Central government, however, was able to exert power through its ability to change the rules, 
leading to new structures for public education provision. The dialectical framework avoids 
the reductionism and functionalism that characterises some of the budget gaming literature. 
 
The issues of political budget theory are now considered in the context of recent 
announcements on National Budgeting and Governing in the UK, in relation to the three 
specific developments identified earlier. 
 
Prologue: The Emergency Budget (June 2010) 
 
As a prelude for what was to come, in June 2010 Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Osborne gave an “emergency” Budget speech only six weeks after the Coalition Government 
came to power. This concentrated on highlighting the nature and level of public debt, the 
need for deficit reduction and set out a range of initial spending cuts that would total an 
additional £32bn per year by 2014-15. It also proposed how an extra £8bn would be raised by 
tax increases during this period – most notably by increasing the rate of Value Added Tax 
from 17.5% to 20% (HM Treasury 2010a). 
 
Act One: The Spending Review (October 2010) 
 
Following on from the Emergency Budget, the October 2010 Spending Review provided a 
framework for reducing public expenditure levels between 2011/12 and 2014/15. For 
example, an announcement of the grant funding that central government provides to English 
local authorities will be cut in real terms by an average of 7.25% over each of the next four 
years (HM Treasury, 2010b). Indeed, in terms of austerity measures, the Spending Review 
sets out the largest prolonged reductions in public spending since the 1920s, dwarfing 
Thatcherite attempts to hollow out the state nearly thirty years ago. After months of 
negotiations behind the scenes, some parts of Whitehall agreed to Budget cuts of approaching 
30% between 2011 and 2015 (HM Treasury, 2010b; Ferry and Eckersley, 2011).  
 The previous Labour Government had made the first attempt at multi-year financial planning 
through its Comprehensive Spending Reviews. However, these took place during a period of 
economic growth and relative stability, when revenues were comparatively predictable and it 
was therefore reasonably straightforward to propose how public money should be spent in the 
forthcoming years. The Coalition Government’s 2010 Spending Review was the UK’s first 
attempt at multi-year financial planning in a time of austerity. This is a much more difficult 
undertaking, since revenue streams from taxation are uncertain and spending plans therefore 
need to be flexible – and there is an overriding requirement to reduce the public deficit 
(Hood, 2010; Pollitt, 2010).  
 
 
Act Two: The Budget (March 2011) 
 
It is within this context that the March 2011 Budget has to be considered (HM Treasury, 
2011). At first glance it appears that no significant changes were made to the Coalition 
Government’s fiscal and spending plans in the Budget, because they were constrained by the 
framework of rules set out in the Spending Review. Following this line of argument, annual 
Budget speeches are now essentially tinkering exercises that try to keep the economy on track 
so that the Government can keep its commitments for the remainder of the Spending Review 
period. In that sense, Budget speeches are reminiscent of the old ‘autumn statements’ that 
Chancellors used to make: there might be the odd nugget of new policy amongst the rhetoric, 
but the important information is mostly about how the economy is performing and whether 
the levels of public revenues and spending are on target. In March 2011 significant 
announcements were unlikely for another reason: the Government was reluctant to further 
upset the financial markets by announcing major changes to its spending or fiscal policy.  
 
This scenario may well have held true when the UK Government was able to bask in the 
stability provided by the long period of economic growth up to the 2008 financial crisis. 
However, closer analysis of the 2011 Budget suggests that the Government was not unduly 
constrained by the Spending Review: instead, it was able to use the Budget to react to 
emerging developments. One such development was the fact that the Office of Budget 
Responsibility downgraded its growth forecasts for the UK economy, meaning that the 
Government would need to borrow an additional £45bn over the next four years to make up 
for lost revenues and fund additional benefits payments. The following examples illustrate 
how the Chancellor was able to make a number of significant announcements to try and 
address this issue. As a result, they show how the Spending Review framework gave 
Ministers a large degree of flexibility to make changes on an annual basis through the 
Budget. 
 
A ‘Budget for Growth’? 
 
A key objective of the Coalition Government has been to change the nature of the UK 
economy so that it relies more on exports and manufacturing, and less on the public sector, 
financial services and debt-fuelled spending. Aware that much of the public was becoming 
concerned about the Government’s focus on cutting public spending and that a sluggish 
economy growth would make it more difficult to reduce the deficit, Ministers promised a 
‘Budget for Growth’ in the spring of 2011. As such, Mr Osborne announced various 
initiatives to try and stimulate private enterprise.  
 
Central to this was a ‘Plan for Growth’ that was published alongside the Budget. This set out 
four aims for the economy:  
 
· To create the most competitive tax system in the G20 
· To make the UK the best place in Europe to start, finance and grow a business  
· To encourage investment and exports as a route to a more balanced economy 
· To create a more educated workforce that is the most flexible in Europe.  
 
A number of reforms to rules were proposed to try and achieve these objectives.  One area of 
significant change was in the planning system. Of particular interest was placing a new ‘duty 
to co-operate’ on Councils to work together to address planning issues that impact beyond 
local boundaries, such as transport, housing or infrastructure. In addition, there was relaxing 
of rules and reforms to stimulate the building of new homes that attempted to enable builders 
to construct new homes and initiatives to get more young people into work through ensuring 
provision of additional apprenticeship places, creating extra new university technical 
colleges, and introducing a new work experience scheme.  
 
More importantly, although the Chancellor described the Budget as being ‘fiscally neutral’, 
he made a number of changes to the tax system that will continue into future years. These 
included increasing the personal allowance by a further £630 in April 2012, and indexing 
future increases in personal tax thresholds to the consumer price index rather than the retail 
price index. The latter is expected to reap more than £1bn a year in extra revenue for the 
Exchequer by 2015-16. There was also a drive to simplify the tax system, including 
consulting on merging income tax with national insurance and scrapping 43 different tax 
reliefs. Together with other reforms, such as the introduction of a carbon tax on the power 
sector, and proposing changes to the way in which poverty is measured, these examples 
demonstrate how the Spending Review framework provides the Chancellor with significant 
room for manoeuvre in annual Budgets.  
 
Indeed, the Budget set out various proposals that would reform the budgeting process itself. 
These included changing rules for how the Spending Review is reported upon, which will 
have implications for the practical understanding of those involved in setting, steering and 
delivering public policy. Most noticeably, the Chancellor announced several changes to the 
Government’s own budgetary procedures – demonstrable proof that the annual Budget is not 
constrained by the Spending Review framework. For example, the End Year Flexibility 
system will be abolished and replaced by a new “Budget Exchange” scheme, which allows 
departments to surrender an under-spend in advance of the end of the financial year in return 
for a corresponding increase in their Budget in the following year. The accounting system 
that governs activity would therefore affect practice. He also reiterated his desire to 
strengthen control over Annually Managed Expenditure, by transferring some of it into 
Departmental Expenditure Limits. The Budget is therefore acting as a catalyst for revisiting 
the Spending Review, enabling policy change that will affect levels of spend across 
Departmental Expenditure Limits and Annually Managed Expenditure boundaries. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated whether the Spending Review provides a definitive framework 
that constrains the annual Budget, or whether the annual Budget provides a means for 
enabling and adaptability. It illustrated that the annuality of the Budget took place within the 
medium term planning framework of the Spending Review, but whilst the Spending Review 
provided a veneer of stability, the changes to rules through the annual Budget shift the 
underlying accounting measures of what is transparently being accomplished. Annuality of 
the Budget therefore remains not constrained within the Spending Review, but is an enabler 
of changing circumstances.   
 
Taken together, annual Budgets and multi-year Spending Reviews can therefore provide a 
balancing of stability and change during periods of deficit reduction. Indeed the annual 
Budget is not merely about Departmental Expenditure Limits but also Annually Managed 
Expenditure. Policy change initiated through the annual Budget can therefore use both 
classifications of expenditure for enabling an affordable, balanced and sustainable position to 
emerge that is reconcilable with the plans of the Spending Review. Far from the annuality of 
the Budget being constrained by the Spending Review, it actually has an effect on the rules, 
objectives and affectivity toward them that determine the practical intelligibility of what 
makes sense to do, enables practical understanding on how to do what makes sense to do to 
be made more common and shared, and has functionality through situated accounting 
mechanisms. As a result, the Budget enables change whilst maintaining the perceived 
stability of the Spending Review that affords it legitimacy. This does not just apply in the 
accounting sense of financial numbers, but also for citizens whose organisational, 
institutional and social lives are shaped by it. 
 
Whether the ‘Budget for Growth’ will accomplish what it sets out to deliver remains 
uncertain. A number of other factors will also play an important role in any economic 
recovery, not least the Eurozone crisis, the level of interest rates and the price of oil. Various 
scenarios could occur, and so the Chancellor may at some point have to reveal a pre-existing 
Plan B or come up with an alternative strategy very quickly. However, as the paper has 
shown, he may be able to do this within the current Spending Review framework, as this does 
not necessarily constrain the annual Budget. In other words, a new Spending Review may not 
be required – even if the Government continues to struggle to reduce the deficit and 
economic growth remains sluggish. 
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